Abstract-Nuclear weapons proliferation is an existing and growing worldwide problem. To help with devising strategies and supporting decisions to interdict the transport of nuclear material, we developed the Pathway Analysis, Threat Response and Interdiction Options Tool (PATRIOT) that provides an analytical approach for evaluating the probability that an adversary smuggling radioactive or special nuclear material will be detected during transit. We incorporate a global, multi-modal transportation network, explicit representation of designed and serendipitous detection opportunities, and multiple threat devices, material types, and shielding levels. This paper presents the general structure of PATRIOT, and focuses on the theoretical framework used to model the reliabilities of all network components that are used to predict the most likely pathways to the target.
INTRODUCTION
Nuclear weapons proliferation is an existing and growing worldwide problem. The shift from nation-sponsored to terrorist-supported nuclear proliferation demands that we evolve our response from simply limiting the development of nuclear weapons to controlling the illicit transportation of nuclear material worldwide. To help with devising strategies to interdict the illegal transport of nuclear material, Los Alamos National Laboratory is developing the Pathway Analysis, Threat Response and Interdiction Options Tool (PATRIOT). This tool provides an analytical approach for evaluating the probability that an adversary smuggling radioactive or special nuclear material will be detected during transit.
PATRIOT
incorporates a global, multi-modal transportation network, explicit representation of designed and serendipitous detection opportunities, and multiple threat devices, material types, and shielding levels. PATRIOT assumes a rational adversary that plans routes based on the perceived reliability of each link in the network. This allows an analyst to explore the effects of information operations, such as the use of decoys and sting operations.
The game board for PATRIOT comprises individual transportation layers. Currently implemented layers include a low resolution road network (VMap0), a low resolution rail network (VMap0), a commercial air network, and a sea network that represents containerized shipping traffic. A summary of the current layers in use in PATRIOT is provided in Table 1 . Each of these network layers can be connected via transfer points called terminals. For example, airports are represented as terminals that connect the air network to the road network. During a typical analysis, the analyst specifies a starting location, an ending location, the object to be transported, and the defensive architecture that will be used. PATRIOT then uses a route finding algorithm to find the multimodal path that minimizes the overall probability of detection during transit.
Typical PATRIOT results are provided in Figure 1 and Figure 2 . In these figure, the perceived risk of being caught was assumed to be proportional to the electoral results for the 2008 Presidential Election. A democrat would view 'blue' counties as being safer, while a republican would view a red county as preferable. Figure 1 depicts the highest reliability path from New York to Los Angeles for a neutral traveler (i.e., ground truth). The blue path in Figure 2 depicts the perceived highest reliability path for a democrat traversing between those same two cities. This paper presents the general structure of PATRIOT, and focuses on the theoretical framework used to model the reliabilities of all network components that are used to predict the most likely pathways to the target. This includes a detailed description of the underlying stochastic processes used to model the various reliabilities and some of the data sources used to estimate the model's parameters. The paper is organized as follows: In section II we model the arc reliabilities and in section III we describe the data sources to estimate the 
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1 Vector Map (VMap) Level 0 is an updated and improved version of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency's (NIMA) Digital Chart of the World (DCW®). The VMap Level 0 database provides worldwide coverage of vector-based geospatial data which can be viewed at 1:1,000,000 scale. The primary source for the database is the 1:1,000,000 scale Operational Navigation Chart (ONC) series co-produced by the military mapping authorities of Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and the United States . http://earth-info.nga.mil/publications/vmap0.html model parameters. Section IV presents the multi-layered network, section V the method to select the most reliable path, and we conclude in section VI.
II. ARCS, THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF PATRIOT
PATRIOT uses a directed arc-node modeling approach to represent allowable transitions from one node to another. These transitions can either be physical (e.g., a flight from Washington, Dulles to the Albuquerque Sunport represents both a physical and a logical connection) or may be logical only (e.g., an arc that represents an adversary's hiding out in a safe haven). In Figure 3 , n 1 , n 2 , and n 3 might represent three airports. The arc a 1,2 represents a flight from n 1 to n 2 , a 2,3 represents a flight from n 2 to n 3 , and a 1,3 represents a flight from n 1 to n 3 . The arc a 2,2 might represent a layover at n 2 . Each arc has several parameters that are used to determine the reliability of that arc for the adversary. In the PATRIOT formulation, the reliability is given by the complement of the probability of detection. Using Q arc for the arc's reliability, then Q arc = 1-P(being detected while traversing the arc).
PATRIOT assumes that the reliability of each arc is independent of the prior path taken to get to that arc. For example, in Figure 3 , the reliability of a 2,3 denoted by 2,3 a Q is not affected by use of the layover at n 2 represented by the arc a 2,2 . Equivalently stated, PATRIOT assumes that network traversal is a Markov Process [1] . With this assumption, the overall reliability of a path consisting of n arcs, say a 1 , a 2 ,…,a n , is simply given by the product of the individual arc reliabilities, 1 2
A. Arc Reliability, PATRIOT assumes that two independent processes are taking place during the traversal of a single arc. The first of these accounts for the probability of randomly encountering a law enforcement officer or other authority who stops the adversary, conducts a search, and discovers the contraband being transported. These stops capture the value of the astute law enforcement officers who notice something suspicious in the vehicle, its markings, or the behavior of the occupant. To model this process, we assume that the number of encounters on the road network between a driver and any police officer is a Poisson process with encounter rate η. The implied assumptions are that the probability of an encounter in a small road segment is proportional to the segment's length, and that encounters on disjoint road segments are independent. Letting E l be the number of such encounters on a given segment of length l, the probability of no encounters can be computed as
Next, among these encounters, the number of detections can be modeled also as a Poisson process with rate ηp, where p represents the probability of detection. Note that the detection process is just a thinning of the encounter process. A consequence of the Poisson assumption is that the distance to the first detection, T D , is exponentially distributed with mean detection distance of 1/hp = 1/µ, where µ is the detection rate P(Td > l) = P(no detection on arc of length l) = e -hpl = e -ml
The other detection process that PATRIOT uses is based on a deliberate search. The assumption is made that the plot will be discovered, the perpetrators will be identified, and then the perpetrators will be apprehended. This process can be viewed as transitions from state to state in time as depicted in Figure 4 . In this figure, l 1 provides the transition rate from the state Threat Undetected to the state Plot Discovered. Thus we model this process as a continuous time Markov chain by assuming that the probability that the process will transition to the next state in a small interval of time is proportional to the length of the interval, and the fact that the process will transition to the next state only depends on its current state, and consequently it is independent of how long it took to get to that state. This process is a pure birth process [2] with transition rates l 1 , l 2 , and l 3 and absorbing state Perpetrators Apprehended. With the above stated assumption, one can derive a system of differential equations for the probabilities that the process is in each of the states, and its solution depends on the initial state of the process (we assume it is the state Undetected), and whether the various transition rates are equal or not. For simplicity we present here only the solution when all transition rates are different, namely 
Since this process is a continuous time Markov chain, the times the process spends in each of the first three states are independent exponential random variables with rates l 1 , l 2 , and l 3 respectively. Thus, the expected time to apprehension T is given by the sum of the expected times spent in the first three states,
Note that the probability of not getting caught while traversing an arc in t units of time P(T>t) is given by one minus the probability of apprehending the perpetrators at time t. Unfortunately, as explained in more detail in section III, we were unable to identify data sources to estimate the individual transition rates l 1 , l 2 , and l 3, but we can estimate the overall mean time to apprehension 1/l 1 +1/l 2 +1/l 3 . The question is how to best approximate the tail probability of the time to apprehension when only this overall mean is known. As an initial approach, PATRIOT approximates the time to apprehension with an exponentially distributed random variable with mean 1/l 1 +1/l 2 +1/l . This is what PATRIOT uses in its current implementation, and as we will show below it is quite reasonable. Figure 5 below depicts the quality of the exponential approximation for various sets of transition rates, all with the same mean apprehension time of 13. The approximation works better when the apprehension time is dominated by a slow process, for example, the yellow line in Figure 5 represents the case when it takes more than 20 times as long to discover a theft than it does to apprehend an identified adversary. Note that as the transition rates become more similar, the approximation worsens, and the worst case overall, is when all the transition rates are exactly the same.
In this case, the time to apprehension has a Gamma distribution with shape parameter equal to 3, and scale parameter λ (=l 1 =l 2 =l 3 ). This distribution provides an alternative approximation for the time to apprehension, and as can be appreciated in Figure 6 , it actually works better in most cases, except when one process heavily dominates the other two. Comparing these two distributions provides bounds for the worst possible error in using either of them. Writing Dt = P(T>t)-P(T*>t) where T is the apprehension time and T* represents the variable used to approximate T, the resulting bounds can be summarized as, 0.21 0.08 ( ) 0.9 0.07
The result of considering the two independent processes representing the random encounters with police officers and the deliberate search process is that several parameters associated with the arc are used to calculate its reliability, Q arc . These parameters are the length of the arc, a speed parameter, a mean The mean distance at which an adversary traveling on the arc would be apprehended by a serendipitous encounter measured in miles.
arc v
The average speed of travel on the arc measured in miles per hour
The mean time that the adversary would be apprehended by a deliberate search, measured in hours.
B. Terminal Nodes
In PATRIOT, all detections are performed on arcs. Nodes simply represent geographic locations and/or states along the path from origin to destination. However, a special node type, Terminal Nodes, provides a convenient method for transferring from one transportation mode to another. These terminal nodes are used to capture the basic processes that take place at locations such as seaports, airports, and rail stations. PATRIOT automatically expands a terminal node into three logical nodes (terminal, arrival gate, and departure gate) and three directed arcs that connect them. 
Each of the three arcs in a terminal (T-to-D, A-to-D, and
A-to-T) has three parameters associated with them: a delay time, a baseline effectiveness, and an operational effectiveness. The delay time gives the average time spent traversing the arc in hours. As an example, the delay time for an A-to-D arc at an airport represents the average lay over time. The baseline effectiveness gives the probability of apprehending an adversary transiting the arc, given optimum operation of defensive measures. The operational effectiveness measure provides the probability that the operational system will achieve an apprehension given that the optimal system achieves an apprehension. These three parameters combine to provide an arc reliability given by:
C. Custom Nodes PATRIOT also includes the concept of a Customs Node. A custom node mirrors the structure of a terminal node and is used to capture added delays and detection capabilities for the three arcs in a terminal node. Detection via the intrinsic terminal node processes and via the custom nodes processes are assumed to be independent. When a terminal node has a customs node assigned to it, its arc reliability cn Q becomes,
customs delay customs baseline customs operational
We describe briefly the data sources we have identified to estimate the parameters involved in the two stochastic processes used to calculate the arc reliabilities and the parameters involved in calculating the nodes reliabilities.
A. Mean Detection Distance
The first process involved in calculating the arc's reliabilities, consisted in random encounters with police officers. For the US the Survey of Police-Public Contact (SPPC) reports on traffic stops and police contacts at the national level, including data about searches and arrest resulting from those stops [3] - [8] . This in conjunction with data about number of vehicles and miles traveled in the US from the Department of Transportation [9] , [10] , allowed us to estimate the rate of traffic stops per mile as shown in Table 2 . The estimate for the year 1999 was straightforward since [3] reported the total number of traffic for the year, which was 27 million. For the other two years, 2002 and 2005, only the total number of annual police contacts were reported, and fortunately, also the nature of the last police contact, whether it was a traffic stop or not. Assuming that both types of police contacts, those involving a traffic stop and those that don't, are Poisson say with rates λ x and λ y respectively, one can prove that the probability p L that the last police contact was actually a traffic stop is just the quotient λ x /(λ x +λ y ). The probability p L can be estimated by dividing the number of traffic stops in the last police-contact by the number of people with at least one police contact, which was provided in the report; and the police contact rate λ x +λ y can be estimated by dividing the number of police contacts by the number of people aged 16 and older. These numbers allowed us to estimate the traffic stops rate λ x provided in Table 2 . Table 3summarizes the statistics on the number of searches and criminal evidence found during those searches. Note that the probability of being searched during a traffic stopped varies between 0.04 and 0.05, and for the probability of detecting an illegal item during the search varies between 0.08 and 0.13, but since we are dealing with trafficking of radioactive and nuclear material, it is reasonable to assume that if the vehicle is searched, the material will be found.
We estimate the detection rate per mile as μ = ηp = 0.97 x 10 -5 x 4 x 10 -2
.
Thus for example a person driving from San Francisco to New York City would travel about 2930 miles, and the probability that this vehicle would be searched can be estimated as, 2930 (being searched from SF to NYC) 1 0.001
Meaning that under normal circumstances, the driver would be caught once out of one thousand trips.
Validation. Our calculations assumed that the number if traffic stops and the number of police contacts are modeled as Poisson processes. Reports [4] and [8] provide data on the empirical distribution of these processes, that at least to a first order, support the Poisson assumption as can be corroborated in Figure 8 and Figure 9 .
B. Mean Apprehension Time
We ultimately would like to estimate the various times involved in trying to detect stolen nuclear or radioactive material. These include the time to the discovery of the theft, the time needed to identify possible suspects, and either the time to their arrest and/or the recovery of the stolen materials. The open source datasets identified mostly provide summary statistics and only allow preliminary estimates for a couple of quantities: the mean and median times to recover stolen or lost nuclear or radioactive material, and the median time to arrest a criminal that is being actively sought by the U.S. authorities. For a more detailed analysis, we would need to get a hold of the datasets described next.
First, the Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) published by the International Atomic Energy Agency since 1993 [14] keeps a detailed record of over thirteen hundred confirmed cases that include unauthorized acquisition, e.g. through theft, provision possession, use transfer or disposal of radioactive or nuclear material with and without crossing borders, as well as unsuccessful acts of the above type. This database has a detailed record of each case, but the IAEA only publishes the summary statistics for the incidents of the year and occasionally, all incidents up to date. Figure 10 shows the number of annual incidents that include thefts or losses from facilities or during transport which were detected and reported to the IDTB for the period 1993 to 2006. These cases include delayed reporting, that is, cases occurring any time before 2006 that may be reported several year later. Note that the year 2006 stands out for the significant increase in incidents which is due almost entirely to a change in reporting practice of one country. From these incidents we find that the recovery rate varies between 25% and 37%, with the lowest recovery rates, between 25-27% for the last four years reported. Without looking at the individual cases, it is hard to say if the decrease in the recovery rate is due to the increased number of incidents reported in 2006, or to an actual increase of successful thefts. In either case, assuming that the time to recover the nuclear or radioactive material has exponential distribution we can estimate the median recovery time to be between 1 year 7 months and 2 years 5 months, with a larger mean recovery time somewhere between 2 years 4 months and about 3 years. The underlying assumptions for the exponential distribution are that the recovery rate in a small time interval is proportional to the length of that interval, and that recoveries on disjoint time intervals are independent events. The median recovery time seems rather large, but one can hypothesize this quantity to be smaller just for stolen materials and/or if we only consider the incidents with larger quantities of nuclear or radioactive material.
The second data set deals with the time needed to clear a warrant since its initiation [15] published by the Department of Justice. Cases include the number of suspects arrested by the various authorities including the U.S. Marshall Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. In particular we are interested in the warrants cleared by arrest which in the year 2005 took a median time of 13 days.
C. Point Detection
Point detection probabilities used in PATRIOT are provided by a separate software package, the Nuclear Detection Figures of Merit [16] , NDFOM. NDFOM was developed for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and provides a physicsbased interpolator that allows users to examine various figures of merit (in this case, the probability of detection) for userspecified detection scenarios. A detection scenario includes such information as the target material, allowable false alarm rate, standoff distance, detection dwell time, and speed of passage of the material past the target. The underlying detection reference points in NDFOM are a combination of test data and high fidelity radiation transport modeling. The operational effectiveness data are derived from testing. IV. GLOBAL TRANSPORTATION NETWORK PATRIOT currently uses the Road Network as the base layer network. The Air, Rail, and Sea networks can be viewed as overlays to this base layer. Each node in the Air, Rail and Sea networks is represented as a Terminal Node. The terminal in each of these terminal nodes is connected to the nearest node in the road network that lies in the same country as the Terminal. Figure 11 provides a schematic of how two layers of the network, the Air layer and the Road layer, would be connected to each other via terminal nodes and layer connector arcs. In PATRIOT, the LAYER CONNECTOR currently have a reliability of 1.0 and do not impose any additional delay in the transit.
V. PATH SELECTION IN PATRIOT
PATRIOT assumes a rational adversary. This rational adversary will not select a pathway that he perceives represents more risk than an alternative pathway. It is not assumed, however, that this rational adversary has either represents more risk than an alternative pathway. It is not assumed, however, that this rational adversary has either perfect knowledge of the network or that he has the ability to completely plan an entire route end-to-end. Each adversary will have biases-an unwillingness to relinquish control of the object is one example-that effects how he estimates the reliability of a given arc. For a given adversary, the arc reliabilities (mean detection distance, mean detection time, and terminal arc effectiveness values) are populated based on the adversary's perception. Note that the path found using the actual reliability values represents the maximum risk pathway. For this rational adversary with perceived arc reliabilities, the maximum reliability path is found using Dijkstra's algorithm.
Dijkstra's Algorithm
Dijkstra's Algorithm provides an efficient approach for finding the shortest distance between two points on a network, or, in the case of PATRIOT, the maximum reliability path between two points. Dijkstra's algorithm works by finding the shortest-path tree from the initial node to every other node in the network. The worst-case running time for the Dijkstra algorithm on a graph with n nodes and m edges is O(n 2 ) [17] .. Alternative implementations useful for sparse graphs utilize priority queues with a Fibonacci heap that makes the time complexity O(m + n ln(n)) [18] .
VI. CONCLUSION
PATRIOT, a full multi-model transportation model has been developed to examine the highest risk and most likely pathways that a terrorist could exploit for transporting illicit radioactive material. This model is flexible in that an arbitrary number of transportation layers (modes) at varying levels of resolution can be readily combined to form a global analysis network. Analytic approximations and relevant data sources have been identified for all key processes being modeled. PATRIOT provides a robust framework for evaluating various defensive architectures against a thinking, planning adversary. 
